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Reflections on Breach of Confidence from the U.S. Experience 
 
By Brian C. Murchison* 
 Breach of confidence, termed an “emerging tort” in the pages of the Columbia Law 
Review more than twenty years ago,
1
 has emerged but is still taking shape.
2
  As commentators 
already have explored its potential conflict with First Amendment freedoms of speech and press,
3
 
the following comment addresses that problem only briefly.  Most of my concern centers on 
breach of confidence in another setting:  its clash with fundamental components of the U.S. civil 
litigation system, specifically the attorney-client privilege, the structure of the adversarial 
process, and rules of discovery.  In a line of decisions, the Supreme Court of Ohio (whose tort 
and other common-law decisions are frequently consulted by other jurisdictions) has protected 
confidentiality of medical records against strong arguments advancing the purpose and 
importance of these basic components of legal process.  Viewing confidentiality as an element of 
autonomy, the Ohio decisions suggest that even fundamentals of legal process cannot override it 
in the typical case.  Those fundamentals, it seems, presuppose protections for core freedoms of 
ordinary life, including the freedom to engage with and rely upon others for information and 
support, all within a mutually agreed-upon zone of confidence.  
1. Confidentiality and Legal Process. 
                                                          
*Charles S. Rowe Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. 
1
 Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 Colum. L . Rev. 1426 (1982).  
2
 David A. Elder, Privacy Torts 5:2 (2006) (noting recognition of confidentiality tort by U.S.courts).  
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In Biddle v. Warren General Hospital,
4
 a law firm working for a hospital proposed a plan 
for obtaining payment of unpaid medical bills.  The hospital would give the firm all patient 
registration forms (numbering about 12,000) on which patients had put name, telephone number, 
age, and medical condition.  The law would review the forms and screen for medical conditions 
that might qualify for benefits under the Social Security Supplemental Income program of the 
U.S. government.  The firm then would telephone any patient whose condition looked promising, 
inform the patient that the call was made on the hospital’s behalf (but apparently not disclose that 
it was a law firm actually calling), file the disability application, and if successful take a fee from 
the hospital.  After the plan was implemented, one of the firm’s secretaries decided to bring the 
scheme to the attention of the media.  A newspaper quickly saw that the situation involved a 
possible breach of patient confidentiality.  Ultimately a class action seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages was filed against the hospital and the firm.  
The Ohio Supreme Court used the case to recognize what it called “an independent 
common-law tort of breach of confidence in the physician-patient setting,”
5
 defined as “the 
unauthorized, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic medical information that a 
physician or hospital has learned within a physician-patient relationship.”
6
  The court recognized 
that the duty was not absolute – that some disclosures without consent are statutorily privileged, 
others are required by common-law duties, and still others are privileged at common law “to 
protect or further a countervailing interest which outweighs the patient’s interest in 
confidentiality.”
7
  The issues in Biddle were whether the hospital could be found liable for 
                                                          
4
 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999). 
5
 Id. at 522. 
6
 Id. at 523. 
7
 Id. at 524. 
3 
 
releasing the records to its attorneys, and if so, whether the firm was liable as well for inducing 
the breach.  
On the first question, the hospital argued that no breach of confidence had occurred in the 
first place – that the firm was the hospital’s alter ego, not a “third party,” and therefore that the 
hospital’s disclosure was a disclosure to itself.
8
  Even if a breach did take place, the firm 
maintained, the functioning of the attorney-client relationship was an important interest 
outweighing the patient’s interest in confidentiality.
9
   The dispute thus reduced to dueling 
relationships, and the Court’s task was to decide which relationship took priority -- the 
physician-patient relationship of confidentiality which encourages individuals to seek out a 
source of medical care and advice, or the attorney-client relationship which contemplates an 
unimpeded flow of information from principal to agent. 
The Court resisted the effort to resolve the case with a notion of attorney-client 
indivisibility.  Instead the Court took the less metaphysical approach of looking at the details of 
the peculiar plan, particularly at the release of a large amount of intimate information leading to 
unsolicited, perhaps misleading calls to patients.
10
   In the Court’s view, no “interest public or 
private” could justify immunity on these facts.
11
  The Court included a long footnote stating that 
the scheme went “far beyond” anything necessary for debt collection.
12
   In addition, the Court 
openly worried that recognizing a privilege in Biddle would pave the way for doctors to “release 
                                                          
8
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9
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 Id. at 527. 
12
 Id. at 527n.1. 
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the bulk of their office files without authorization so that a lawyer [could] search through them 
for potential workers’ compensation or personal injury claimants.”
13
   
In tort terms, the sense was that the burden of obtaining the patients’ consent was far less 
than the magnitude of the harm to the confidential relationship.  In contract terms, the releases 
originally signed by the patients contained no language that could be stretched to support the 
hospital’s disclosures to the law firm.  In moral terms, the Court endorsed a strict concept of 
confidentiality, in which parties agree to forego any self-interested use of shared confidential 
information absent a reasonable opportunity for the other party to register opposition.  The Court 
thus protected the reasonable expectation of autonomy within a medical relationship, and 
recognized a clear violation of that autonomy in the hospital’s wholesale “informational 
release”
14
 for financial rather than medical purposes.      
 The Court also recognized an action for tortious inducement, which would be available if 
the relevant party (here the law firm) knew or should have known of the confidential 
relationship, intended to induce disclosure, and lacked any reasonable belief that the disclosure 
would not violate the duty owed to the patient.
15
   After declaring that both actions were part of 
Ohio law, the Court boldly applied the newly announced elements to the facts, ruling that 
reasonable minds could find violations of the duties.
16
 
 Biddle invites speculation about its fundamental rationale.  On both sides of the case, 
information was shared within a relationship of trust.  Patients shared intimate facts with the 
hospital, and the hospital shared the same facts with its attorneys, who had their own duty of 
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confidentiality.  On both sides, the trust relationship facilitated freedom: the patients confided in 
the hospital in order to receive sound medical help and thus enhance their freedom to live as they 
chose, and the hospital shared the records with their advisors in order to expand their commercial 
and professional options.  The hospital’s point might even have been that a free flow of 
information from client to attorney about all aspects of hospital services was necessary for, and 
conceptually “prior to,” the hospital’s ability to provide confidential services in the first place.  
The Court, however, staunchly rejected any such suggestion, asserting that the firm was simply 
not “an acceptable legal repository for the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information 
that the principal learned within another confidential relationship.”
17
  But why was the firm not 
“acceptable”?   It may be that the conduct of the “attorney” and “client” on these facts was so 
clumsily and needlessly intrusive that the “relationship” seemed a cover for exploitative conduct.  
Or perhaps the Court believed that, although both relationships were social goods, the medical  
relationship’s benefits for the individual were more socially useful than the attorney-client 
relationship’s benefits for the hospital’s welfare.  Whatever the rationale, the Court showed no 
hesitation in protecting patient autonomy and brushing aside formalisms about attorneys and 
clients.         
 In a second case, the same state supreme court confronted another clash between medical 
confidentiality and a supposed bulwark of legal process – here, the conventional practice of 
adversarial litigation.  In Hageman v. Southwest General Health Center,
18
 an attorney 
represented a wife in a divorce and child custody case.   The husband counterclaimed for 
custody, effectively waiving the privilege to keep confidential his medical records, including 
those relating to mental health.  The wife’s attorney then lawfully obtained the husband’s 
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psychiatric records.  Meanwhile, the husband allegedly assaulted the wife, and a criminal 
investigation began.  It was then that a key step was taken:  the wife’s attorney turned over the 
husband’s psychiatric records to the prosecutor in the assault case.  
 The husband sued the wife’s attorney for breach of confidence, alleging wrongful release 
of the medical records to the prosecutor.  The defendant-attorney argued that the husband had 
waived the privilege in the civil divorce case and that the waiver carried over to the criminal 
case, especially since the husband had made no effort to seek a protective order.
19
  The Ohio 
Supreme Court disagreed, finding “no legal justification” for, or “practical benefit” in, the notion 
that a patient’s “waiver for a specific, limited purpose is a waiver for another purpose.”
20
  The 
Court’s concern was that a contrary ruling could undermine individuals’ willingness to seek 
medical (specifically psychiatric) care.
21
  The Court worried too about the potential for abuse of 
waiver -- that a lawyer who, as in this case, had obtained records in a civil matter could 
“intensify legal pressure” on the other party if the law permitted the lawyer to disclose the 
records in other matters.
22
  Recognizing an “independent tort,”
23
 the Court held that the attorney 
was subject to liability. 
 In Hageman, the confidentiality interest came into nearly open conflict with an interest at 
the heart of the U.S. legal process – its reliance on the adversarial structure of adjudication, in 
which opposing sides must press their own interests through legal moves and counter-moves.  
Here the defendant attorney insisted that it was up to the plaintiff to protect his own psychiatric 
records  – in effect, that the very nature of the adversarial process put the burden on the plaintiff 
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22
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23
 Id. at 158. 
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to guard against further spread of the records by obtaining a protective order.
24
  The Court 
declined to answer the charge directly, coolly dodging it by concluding that the plaintiff had had 
“no opportunity” to seek a protective order.
25
   The Court nevertheless acknowledged the 
argument’s importance, conceding that “it may be appropriate to discuss the failure to take 
protective measures” in a later case.
26
  At the same time, the dynamics of the adversarial process 
played a key role in the outcome, but working against, rather than for, the defendant.  As noted, 
the Court ruled that the defendant’s claimed right to release the medical records in other matters 
would enable parties in future cases to gain an unfair advantage.  The Court’s concern was 
therefore not that the plaintiff had stumbled by neglecting to seek a protective order, but that the 
defendant was insisting on a right to disclose that would give future defendants too great a 
chance to make the adversarial process sharper than it usually is.  Just as the Court in Biddle had 
been uneasy about the exploitative potential of the attorney-client relationship, the Court in 
Hageman showed discomfort with a potentially abusive use of medical information as a 
bargaining chip in the context of divorce.  In both cases, then, when confidentiality interests 
competed with basic features of the legal process, the Court demonstrated awareness of how 
good things can be used for ill – here, how elements of legal process that generally support the 
pursuit of justice can push against limits and threaten abuse.    
 In a third Ohio case, Roe v. Planned Parenthood,
27
 a thirteen-year-old girl became 
pregnant by her 21-year-old soccer coach, who urged her to have an abortion at Planned 
Parenthood.  Since Ohio requires parental notification and consent, the coach posed as the girl’s 
father when Planned Parenthood called on the telephone for consent.  The coach posed as the 
                                                          
24




 Id.  
27
 912 N.E.2d 61 (Ohio 2009). 
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girl’s brother on the day of the procedure.  Afterwards, the parents discovered that their daughter 
had had an abortion, and the coach was convicted of seven counts of sexual battery.  The parents 
brought a civil action against Planned Parenthood, alleging failure to notify them and to obtain 
their consent, failure to obtain the girl’s consent, and failure to report to state authorities 
suspected sexual abuse of a minor who was receiving medical services from the defendant.  In 
discovery, the parents sought ten years’ worth of nonparty records from Planned Parenthood, 
specifically any abuse reports filed with state authorities and medical records of minors who had 
been the defendant’s patients.  The parents sought this information in order to bolster their claim 
for punitive damages by establishing a “systematic and intentional breach of the duty to report 
suspected abuse” under state law.
28
   When Planned Parenthood declined to turn over the 
requested records, the parents moved to compel production of the materials with identifying 
information redacted.  The trial court ordered production, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed.  
The Court noted that Biddle and Hageman had been confined to recognizing actions for improper 
release of medical records and associated defenses.
29
  The Court emphasized that those decisions 
had not involved discovery and could not be invoked to compel production of nonparties’ 
confidential records.  Unwilling to create a new rule for the discovery context, the Court 
announced, “Any exception to the physician-patient privilege is a matter for the General 
Assembly…”
30
  Of particular note, the Court found redaction “merely a tool” to safeguard 
personal information within confidential records that become subject to disclosure.
31
  
 The Roe plaintiffs, like the defendants in Biddle and Hageman, argued against 
confidentiality by insisting that disclosure was justified by a core component of legal process.  
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30
 Id. at 71. 
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That component was nothing less than “the public’s interest in justice,”
32
 which supported 
obtaining the proof necessary to establish a recognized claim.  As the dissenting judge variously 
restated this interest, the plaintiffs were invoking a fundamental “right to seek redress,” a “right 
to litigate their claims,” a “right to examine every possible legal argument” against the 
defendant.
33
  The requested discovery, the plaintiffs maintained, was essential to vindicating the 
rights of abused children as well as parents’ rights “to protect their minor children and to guide 
their medical treatment.”
34
  And so the lofty goal of legal process -- that “[t]he truth be known as 
far as possible to enable the law to provide justice in each case”
35
 – was set against the interest of 
medical confidentiality.   
Again, the latter prevailed, the Court disagreeing sharply with a number of lower court 
decisions that had extrapolated a discovery interest from Biddle’s recognition of a common-law 
“defense.”  The Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ invocation of “public policy,” explaining that 
the case was not a class action, had no “criminal implications,” and thus involved only the parties 
to the case.
36
  On this point, the Court was not persuasive; tort cases can implicate public policy 
without being class actions and without the involvement of criminal law.  The Court was on 
firmer ground in suggesting that the requested discovery was simply not essential – that the 
plaintiffs could proceed with their case without it
37
 – although the Court declined to fashion a 
rule that turned on essentiality.  Instead, the Court left all rulemaking concerning discovery of 
nonparty confidential medical records to the elected branches, as if to say that the requested 
holding was too substantial and too controversial for common-law decision-making.  As in 
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 Id. at 81 (Donovan, J., dissenting) (reviewing plaintiffs’ arguments in previous cases). 
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Biddle and Hageman, there was palpable skepticism about countervailing values of legal process, 
even about so familiar a tool as redaction.  The interest in medical confidentiality was too 
important and at the same time too fragile, and the general goal of facilitating informational flow 
for the achievement of justice too amorphous and too overbearing, to produce any other 
outcome.   
2. Confidentiality and the Marketplace of Ideas. 
When we turn from the flow of information in the litigation system, and confront the flow 
of information in the “marketplace of ideas,” has the confidentiality interest enjoyed similar 
success?  Despite recent scholarship calling for a reinvigorated action for breach of confidence, 
the cases involving a clash between a plaintiff’s confidentiality interest and a speaker’s exercise 
of First Amendment freedoms have been few.  Certainly the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to take 
up the question.  
 The Supreme Court has taken up the action for public disclosure of private facts.  In three 
well-known decisions --  Cox Broadcasting Corp.  v. Cohn,
38
 Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co.,
39
 and 
The Florida Star v. B.J.F.
40
 -- the Court invoking freedoms of speech and press has all but pre-
empted a damages action for invasion of privacy.  Does this mean that an action for breach of 
confidentiality would meet the same fate?  Not necessarily.  In each of the three privacy cases, 
the Court found that the challenged speech involved “a matter of public concern.”  While these 
cases certainly would be relevant to a test of the confidentiality action, the Court could find in 
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 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
39
 443 U.S. 97(1979). 
40
 491 U.S. 524 (1989).  
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another decision – the 2001 case of Bartnicki v. Vopper
41
 – a plausible roadmap for 
accommodating the confidentiality tort with the strictness of First Amendment analysis.   
In Bartnicki, the Court recognized the interest of “privacy of communication”
42
 in a cell 
phone conversation between two union members discussing a contentious labor negotiation.  
This “private speech”
43
 was intercepted, taped, delivered to a radio station, and ultimately 
broadcast, prompting suit against the radio station by the original parties to the call.  The 
plaintiffs sued for damages under federal and state wiretapping laws and survived a motion for 
summary judgment.  The High Court reversed, holding that the First Amendment protected the 
station’s right to disseminate “a matter of public concern,”
44
 and that the statutes were therefore 
unconstitutional as applied.  At the same time, the Court acknowledged that the value of private 
speech was part of the “constitutional calculus.”
45
  In an important concurrence, Justice Stephen 
Breyer called for a nuanced framework.  Noting that the cell phone conversation at issue 
concerned possibly violent union activity, Justice Breyer observed that the plaintiffs had 
“unusually low privacy expectations” in the conversation, in contrast to an “unusually high” 
public interest in the subject matter.
46
  This approach may suggest a way to examine the 
confidentiality interest in an eventual case, taking account of the importance of private speech 
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 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
42
 Id. at 532-33. 
43
 Id. at 518. 
44
 Id. at 535. 
45
 Id. at 533. 
46
 Id. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
47
 Accord, Barendt, supra note 2. 
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Suppose, then, that a case reaches the Court involving broadcast of an intercepted cell 
phone conversation between the same two union members, A & B, embroiled in the same 
negotiation, but this time discussing A’s health problems rather than the labor issue.  It is 
unlikely that any matter of “public concern” would be directly or indirectly implicated.  Because 
A’s expectation of privacy would be “unusually high,” a suit sounding in breach of confidence or 
based on the wiretapping statutes would likely survive First Amendment challenge.  Now 
suppose a different conversation:  A confiding to B that A has been struggling with serious 
doubts about the merits of their public position in the labor negotiation.  If, as before, a third 
party intercepts the conversation and a radio station sends it over the air, the Court would likely 
find it related to a matter of public concern – the ongoing negotiation.  However, it is far from 
clear that the “public interest” in A’s private struggles would be “unusually high,” as was the 
violence-tinged conversation in Bartnicki, nor is it clear that A’s expectation of privacy would be 
considered “unusually low.”  More likely, a Court cognizant of the value of private speech would 
protect A’s freedom to work through his doubts and develop his thoughts on an important issue 
in dialogue with a trusted associate.  Private speech of this kind surely deserves substantial 
weight in a “constitutional calculus,” and could prevail over the interest in public dissemination 
of the intercepted dialogue – at least, if a Breyer-like analysis finds favor among a majority of 
Justices. 
3.  Concluding Thoughts 
Finally, it is worth noting that, despite increasing recognition of the action for breach of 
confidence in the United States, and despite predictions that it might withstand the heat of the 
First Amendment, it is not yet always available.  Yet even where it is not invoked by name, its 
arrival in the broader legal culture seems to be having an effect.  Thus, in a 2009 case in 
13 
 
Minnesota, Yath v. Fairview Clinics,
48
 a plaintiff sued a medical clinic when the plaintiff’s 
medical condition turned up on an unrestricted webpage on Myspace.com.  The suit, however, 
was not for breach of confidence but for public disclosure of private facts, and the case risked 
dismissal due to the “publicity element” of the public disclosure tort.  The problem was that the 
plaintiff had been able to prove only that “a small number of people actually viewed” the 
webpage; moreover, the webpage had been accessible only for one or two days.
49
  The 
defendants therefore argued that the “publicity” element could not be met, maintaining that “a 
finding of publicity depends on the matter being communicated to such a large number of people 
that it becomes public knowledge.”
50
  The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected the argument, 
concluding that the Restatement (Second) of Torts does not require proof of large numbers but 
can be satisfied simply by proof that the information was posted on a publicly accessible 
webpage.
51
  Did the court borrow conceptually from the action for breach of confidence in 
declining to mandate proof of widespread numbers of readers?
52
   The case was ultimately 
dismissed on other grounds, but its flexible understanding of “publicity” suggests that courts 
confronting new modes of privacy invasion may refine doctrine creatively.  The public 
disclosure tort may take on aspects of the confidentiality tort in the time-honored process of the 
common law.    
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